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The Effect of Youth Demographics on Violence:  
The Importance of the Labor Market
Noah Q. Bricker, Department of Economics, Davidson College, United States
Mark C. Foley, Department of Economics, Davidson College, United States
Recent uprisings in the Middle East have increased interest in the roots of moderate as well as severe political and social conflicts. One popular explanation 
for upticks in violence is the “youth bulge,” the presence of disproportionately large youth cohorts. We refine that model using a panel dataset that includes 
more countries and years than previous literature and implement new measurement techniques to capture the relationship between large youth populations 
and violence. Contrary to prior literature, we find that the mere presence of a “youth bulge” is not enough to generate violence, but instead the causal roots of 
violence lie in the pressure youth cohorts exert on the total labor force. We use a new variable, the Youth Risk Factor (the ratio of the youth population to the 
total labor force), to measure the stress youth cohorts exert on labor markets, and find a significant and large effect on violence. These results have policy im-
plications for countries that currently face large youth cohorts and help explain why conventional policy measures such as increasing educational access are 
likely not the answer to reducing violence.
The demographic trend of increasingly large youth popu-
lations in the Middle East, Latin America, and Africa is a 
cause for concern among academics, policymakers, and 
governments (Zogby 2011). Youth now represent a dis-
proportionately large fraction of total populations in 
much of the developing world and will continue to do so 
as countries complete the demographic transition with 
fertility rates declining to match already low death rates. 
This well-documented phenomenon appears to be accel-
erating among developing nations, and as a consequence, 
youth are playing an increasingly important role in 
society and politics. Iran’s experience, where the fertility 
rate fell from 7.0 births per woman in 1979 at the onset 
of the revolution to around 2.1 in 2000, epitomizes the 
transition (Abbasi-Shavazi, McDonald, Meimanat 2003). 
The speed of change is unprecedented, especially when 
compared to the several-century transitions of Western 
nations (Van de Kaa 2002). As a result, the swelling youth 
populations pose an increasingly large problem and 
almost every country has experienced, is currently 
experiencing, or will experience a ballooning youth 
population.
Policymakers’ concerns over the demographic transition 
arise from the suggested link between large youth popu-
lations and conflict. While Richard Easterlin published 
much of the original work on the sociological and econ-
omic implications of cohort crowding, more causal links to 
violence appear only in more recent work (Easterlin 1978, 
1980). With a greater focus on the developing world, con-
temporary literature suggests that large youth populations 
alone are enough to increase the likelihood of violence and 
conflict (Kaplan 1994; Marcus 2008; Urdal 2004). Sociol-
ogists, anthropologists, and economists pose various hypo-
theses as to why violence is more prevalent in nations 
experiencing large youth bulges, but few seem to doubt the 
trend. Hudson (1999) expresses the now prominent idea 
that youth disproportionately participate in extreme beha-
vior because of a lack of developmental maturity; there-
fore, a population with more youth is inherently more 
volatile. A corollary argument states that when young 
populations vastly outnumber older generations, the older 
members of society are unable to control and discipline the 
more unruly youth cohort (Hart, Atkins, and Youniss 
2005). Others believe that the young, commonly con-
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sidered “revolutionaries,” are easily won over by charis-
matic leaders and convinced to take part in radical 
movements (Hudson 1999) or that perhaps youth have 
lower opportunity costs of violence because of typically 
having lower wages and fewer opportunities than other 
members of society. Regardless of the theory, two measure-
ments are predominantly used to capture the tension cre-
ated by the youth bulge in society: the ratio of 15- to 
24-year-olds to either the 15-plus population or the total 
population. We argue that these rough indices less accu-
rately capture the effect of youth than other potential 
measures, and thus have led to incomplete results.
Additionally, historical evidence shows some of the most 
violent periods of unrest in human history are linked to the 
presence of large youth cohorts and times of generational 
instability. Youth demographics have grown in importance 
recently after links were made between youth bulges and 
periods of severe conflict related to independence in coun-
tries such as Algeria and El Salvador (Kahl 2006). Mayer 
has argued that the French Revolution and the “year of 
unrest” in 1848 may also have roots in ballooning youth 
populations (Mayer 2002). Regardless of these correlations, 
the effects of youth bulges are still largely unknown, and 
contradictory research is emerging about possibly positive 
side-effects of large youth cohorts (Bloom and Williamson 
1998 ; Laipson 2002; Urdal 2006). Using the term “demo-
graphic dividend,” Bloom and Williamson (1998) argue 
that youth populations played an important role in the 
success of the Asian Tiger economies. The term “demo-
graphic dividend” indicates that economic growth occurs 
within youth-heavy populations because they contain a 
large productive labor force relative to a small group of 
dependent young and elderly. Bloom, Canning, and Mal-
aney (2009) attribute one-third to one-half of East Asian 
growth to favorable demographics. And Bloom and Finlay 
(2009) show that the large positive impact remains true 
when the data are extended through 2005.
In response to the seemingly contradictory results, Urdal 
(2006), Barakat and Urdal (2009), and Marcus, Islam, and 
Moloney (2008) argue that the presence of youth alone 
does not generate violence, and place a renewed emphasis 
on the social, economic, and political factors surrounding 
the successes and failures of countries experiencing large 
youth cohorts. Marcus, Islam, and Moloney (2008) scruti-
nize other demographic factors such as the size of the 
elderly and the extremely young population cohorts in an 
attempt to find a more nuanced relationship between 
demographics and violence. However, their reasoning fol-
lows earlier theory based upon the premise that the 15- to 
24-year-old age group being inherently unruly without 
other parts of the population serving as a balance mech-
anism. Barakat and Urdal (2009) promote the idea of 
increased access to education and argue that large male 
youth cohorts increase the likelihood of conflict when their 
level of education is low, but our results do not support 
their theories. Additionally, they begin to consider the idea 
of measuring the size of the youth cohort in different ways 
with a relative youth cohort size variable.
While good scholarly work exists, there is a need for con-
tinued research, and our paper adds to the literature in three 
important ways: larger sample sizes, additional control vari-
ables, and a measure of youth population more closely tied 
to the labor force. To address sample size, contemporary 
works like Barakat and Urdal (2009) and Marcus (2008) 
include data for about 120 nations and only seven years 
(using annual data or, at times, data in five-year increments). 
We improve upon this with 166 countries and annual data 
from 1996 through 2010, representing a substantial increase 
in data points. Furthermore, we work with more recent data 
that is relevant to present policy formation and more accu-
rate because of advances in data collection techniques and 
measurement (World Bank 2007). Furthermore, we found 
that the results from several previous models did not hold 
for our expanded dataset, which raises doubts about the 
robustness of the main effects. Additionally, these models 
omit important control variables, in particular natural 
resource wealth, trade openness, and education.
Our last contribution is to capture more accurately the 
causal effect of youth on violence by employing a new vari-
able called the Youth Risk Factor (YRF), which is the ratio 
of the number of 17- to 26-year-olds to the size of a 
country’s total labor force. This ratio measures the relative 
stress a youth cohort exerts on labor markets as they look 
to become employed. Our theory is that youth, regardless 
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of education level, cause increased violence as the ratio of 
youth 17 to 26 to the total labor force grows, indicating the 
strain exerted on labor markets and governments. As far as 
we are aware, no empirical research has measured a youth 
cohort in this manner. Prior research has focused on 
younger age groups that are less likely to seek full time 
employment, and also not directly compared the size of a 
rising youth cohort to the size of the labor force. We com-
pare this age group with the labor force, rather than the 
general population, in order to more directly capture the 
labor-force-related stresses young individuals experience in 
moving toward independence. We also attempt to account 
for the phenomenon of large groups of “idle” youth exiting 
the labor force out of discouragement, and potentially 
turning their frustration into violence.
An expansion upon our theory and model, as well as a more 
in-depth look at youth labor markets, follow in section 2. 
Section 3 addresses the details of our dataset along with our 
econometric techniques. Section 4 discusses results and 
countries with high Youth Risk Factor values, and we close 
with conclusions and policy implications in Section 5.
1. The Difficult Transition into the Labor Force
 The difficulties youth encounter upon entering the labor 
force is not a new topic of research, which makes its 
absence from the study of youth demographics and conflict 
surprising. Bloom, Freeman, and Korenman (1987) as well 
as Korenman and Neumark (1997) provide the most 
detailed discussion of youth labor markets and demo-
graphics with several key points. Bloom, Freeman, and 
Korenman (1987) claim that members of the baby boom 
generation in the United States and other large youth 
cohorts after World War II faced reduced wages and high 
rates of unemployment because of the stiff competition 
among individuals within a large age cohort. Similarly, 
Korenman and Neumark (1997) report in their preferred 
regression results that unemployment increases for 
members of large youth cohorts. We wish to take their 
cohort crowding theory one step further and apply it to the 
concept of violence. Not only do unemployment and 
underemployment rise for members of large youth cohorts, 
potentially increasing violence, the number of idle youth 
also rises as a result of large youth cohorts (International 
Labor Organization 2012). These youth exit the labor force 
out of frustration, so they are not captured in employment 
data, but only through the use of demographic data, which 
we implement in the Youth Risk Factor.
 Barakat and Urdal (2009) try more explicitly than Koren-
man and Neumark (1997) to connect the size of youth 
cohorts to conflict, but focus on education as a mediator 
and potential solution to the problem of youth-created 
unrest. They theorize that decreased levels of education 
lead to a higher likelihood of conflict and while they men-
tion the possible difficulties of transition from education to 
the labor market, they do not attempt to measure the prob-
lem or test it. They do address the possibility mentioned by 
Gurr (1970) that increased educational opportunities 
might increase grievances and frustration among the youth 
unable to find jobs, but find no evidence for the theory. 
They instead primarily argue that higher education levels 
among youth increase the opportunity cost of violence and 
should therefore lead to decreased levels of violence. This 
research implicitly assumes that people with more edu-
cation will be better able to find jobs, which is not pres-
ently the case in a number of economies, especially in the 
developing world. Furthermore, there is evidence that 
increased access to educational opportunities has no posi-
tive effects on wages or poverty reduction in developing 
countries (Fazih 2008; Assaad and Roudi-Fahimi 2007). 
Additionally, the transition from the educational world to 
the labor force is not seamless. Therefore, we control for 
education and use a measure of youth relative to the labor 
force to account, however imperfectly, for the stress a 
demographic cohort places on the labor market.
1.1. Youth Risk Factor Defined
 As previously stated, our Youth Risk Factor is the ratio of 
the 17- to 26-year-old age cohort to the size of the total 
labor force. This measurement is a departure from previous 
literature and youth bulge measurement in several respects. 
First, we have shifted the age group to an older section of 
the population to compensate for the later entrance of 
youth into the labor force among current generations. 
Fewer 15-year-olds than in previous generations are 
expected to have finished school or vocational training, or 
to hold consistent full-time employment (Donahue and 
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Tienda 1999). Donahue and Tienda (1999) also argue that 
the expectation of stable employment does not begin until 
the late teens or early twenties, with important impli-
cations. In general, 15-year-olds unable to find jobs may be 
frustrated but do not expect to be fully employed or feel 
that unemployment prevents them from achieving future 
goals. Only in older age groups would unemployment pre-
vent youth from achieving social independence, con-
tributing substantially to their communities, and achieving 
the financial independence to marry, which are the most 
frustrating side effects of youth unemployment, especially 
in the Middle East (Kent and Roudi-Fahimi 2007; Assaad 
and Roudi-Fahimi 2007; Watkins 2011). Consequently, 17 
years of age is a more appropriate age to target as the begin-
ning of a demographic measure. Estimation results support 
this idea.1 As the age group is shifted to represent an older 
portion of the youth population, our results indicate that 
the older age-cohorts have a larger effect on violence.
Next, we compare this youth cohort to the size of the total 
labor force in order to measure the pressure on the labor 
market to absorb these youth, which we think is an import-
ant determinant of whether conflict will occur in a country 
experiencing a relatively large group of 17- to 26-year-olds. 
We hypothesize that the greater the size of the youth cohort 
relative to the size of the total labor force, the greater the like-
lihood of conflict because ultimately youth need jobs to put 
food on the table, marry, and progress into adulthood. The 
labor force is equal to the sum of unemployed plus employed 
persons, but many members of the youth cohort have little to 
no attachment to the labor force. This idleness leads to dis-
couragement and frustration, and thus, violence can emerge 
among youth when labor markets are unable to absorb them.
When number of jobs needed to absorb a rising youth popu-
lation is large, youth face underemployment, unem-
ployment, and many simply leave the labor force altogether 
(International Labor Organization 2012). This is why youth 
unemployment rates, even if available,2 would not 
adequately capture the effects on violence. We therefore use 
demographic and population measures to capture these “idle 
and discouraged” youth who are absent from the labor force.
The traditional youth bulge measurement can differ dra-
matically from this Youth Risk Factor variable in certain 
countries. Take Tunisia over last decade as an example: the 
typical youth bulge measurement, the ratio of 15- to 
24-year-olds to the population older than 15, hovers 
around the world average of 0.27 and dips below it in 
recent years. However, the Youth Risk Factor for Tunisia 
has been more than 1 standard deviation above the world 
average for most of the past decade and especially recently, 
which is particularly noteworthy in light of the recent 
political unrest in Tunisia. This trend is true for many of 
the countries that have entered into conflict since 2010, 
where our data end, thus the events that have transpired 
are consistent with the basic premise of our model.
1.2. Model Development
 Our model rests on the assumption that we can measure 
not only cases of severe conflict but also low-level violence, 
protests, and tensions between different groups. We did not 
use the Uppsala PRIO datasets of conflict, which have been 
a common source in prior literature (Marcus 2008; Barakat 
and Urdal 2009). For the most part, these conflict indices 
are more suited for capturing large-scale incidences of viol-
ence because of the requirements that there must be battle-
field deaths and government involvement in the conflict. 
Furthermore, they fail to capture the intensity of conflict 
accurately as they only rank conflicts in terms of deaths 
and use 1,000 deaths as the divider between severe and 
minor conflict, which is a blunt cutoff.
 We desired a broader measure of conflict and therefore, 
following Marcus, Islam, and Moloney (2008), constructed 
a conflict index compiled from the Conflict Barometer 
reports published by the Heidelberg Institute for Inter-
national Conflict Research (HIIK). HIIK is associated with 
the Department of Political Science at University of Hei-
delberg and concentrates on the documentation of intra- 
1 The coefficient for the Youth Risk Factor grows 
steadily larger as we move the lower bound from 15 
to 16 to 17 to 18, before leveling off at a fairly con-
sistent value. We believe these results further sup-
port our theoretical reasons for raising the lower 
bound of the demographic measurement.
2 Youth unemployment data is at this point 
unavailable or not accurate enough to use in a study 
that includes developing countries.
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and interstate conflicts. Their results are published 
annually in the Conflict Barometer which reports current 
global conflicts, their escalations and de-escalations, coups 
d’état, protests, and terrorist attacks. HIIK provides 
detailed coverage of these events listing state and non-state 
actors, duration, historical analysis, and most importantly, 
intensity of conflict. They define conflict as “as the clashing 
of interests and values of some duration and magnitude 
between at least two parties whether they be organized 
groups, states, groups of states, or other organizations,” 
making it a highly detailed and comprehensive dataset of 
conflict. HIIK separates conflict into five categories: latent 
conflict (defined as a dispute), manifest conflict (a non-
violent crisis), crisis (involving sporadic periods of viol-
ence), severe crisis (which is limited war), and war (which 
indicates a full-scale conflict). These categories are scored 
from one to five, with latent conflict counting as one up to 
war counting as five. A country’s total conflict score, our 
dependent variable, is the sum of all conflicts a country is 
involved in over a calendar year. This delineation is par-
ticularly helpful when considering the political unrest and 
violence that is attributable to youth because it covers a 
much broader range of conflict than just civil war.
 As an example, we will demonstrate how we coded 
Uganda’s conflict score for 2009. HIIK discusses three 
internal conflict disputes as well as three external conflicts. 
The Ugandan government was involved in an active but 
non-violent dispute with the puritanical Muslim Allied 
Democratic Forces over the legitimacy of the government’s 
rule, which received a score of two. Simultaneously, the 
Buganda kingdom, a southern region claiming autonomy, 
opposed the authority of the Ugandan government over 
their territory and a series of occasionally violent conflicts 
erupted in September 2009. The most violent day was Sep-
tember 11 with twenty-seven protester deaths and eight 
hundred arrests, causing the conflict to receive a score of 
three. Earlier in 2009, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), 
now famous because of Joseph Kony’s leadership, entered 
northern Uganda and spent almost six months in an 
ongoing struggle with Ugandan government forces, which 
caused the conflict to receive a conflict score of four 
because of the high death tolls and sustained conflict. As 
for interstate conflicts, Uganda was involved in minor dis-
putes with Sudan in the north and Rwanda in the south 
over natural resources that each received the designation of 
latent conflict and the score of one. Lastly, Uganda entered 
into several heated diplomatic exchanges with the DR 
Congo over Lake Albert, creating an additional conflict that 
was scored as a two. Therefore, Uganda’s conflict score for 
2009 was thirteen (2+3+4+1+1+2). We chose Uganda as an 
example to demonstrate the varieties of conflict as well as 
the comprehensive coverage by the Conflict Barometer. We 
used a similar coding technique for all countries from 1996 
through 2010 to form the dependent variable.
1.3. Model Specification
Given that the dependent variable takes on a value of 0 for 
many of the country-year observations, we estimate ran-
dom effects Tobit models of the following form:
Conflict*it = γ1YouthRiskFactorit + γ2YouthBustit + x!itβ + αi + εit
and Conflictit = max(0,Conflict
*
it)
where i indexes countries and t indexes years,   are 
country random effects, and idiosyncratic error  . 
The index   may be thought of as a latent variable 
measuring the propensity for conflict in a country. Observed 
level of conflict, conflict
it
, takes on non-negative values. Fig-
ure 1 indicates that in approximately 36 percent of country-
year observations there is no conflict, with positive values 
roughly following a normal distribution.
αi ~ N(0,σ2α)
εit ~ N(0,σ2ε)
Conflict*it
Distribution of Conflict Intensity, 1996 – 2010
4
3
2
1
0
012345 10 15 20
Figure 1: Distribution of conflict intensity, 1996–2010
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The primary coefficients of interest are γ
1
 and γ
2
 which 
capture the effects of the demographic ratios, Youth Risk 
Factor and Youth Bust, on conflict. Youth Risk Factor is 
related to similar variables in prior work, but different as 
explained above. Following prior research, Youth Bust is 
the ratio of the number of 0 to 14 year olds divided by the 
number of 15 to 24 year olds. It is sometimes also referred 
to as the Relative Youth Cohort. The vector of covariates x,
it
 
includes variables to control for the effects of technological 
development (number of telephone lines), macroeconomic 
situation (GDP per capita, GDP growth rate, inflation, 
trade openness), country characteristics (total population, 
number of ethnic groups, number of bordering countries, 
length of borders, land area, and natural resource rents), 
opportunity cost of engaging in conflict (gross enrollment 
rate in secondary education), a measure of the rule of law, 
and prior level of conflict.
 Several variables in our model are new to demographic 
conflict research, and thus deserve further discussion. We 
introduce three control variables neglected in prior conflict 
literature. First, trade openness has been shown to reduce 
intrastate conflict and, in certain conditions, reduce inter-
state conflict as well (Barbieri 1996). The logic behind the 
reduction in intrastate conflict is the rise in opportunity 
cost of unrest if substantial revenue comes from trade with 
multiple other countries or just strong bilateral trade 
relations. Leaders know this revenue will most likely be lost 
upon entering into substantial conflict, so they hesitate to 
initiate conflict, especially if they are part of the ruling 
group. The reduction in interstate conflict follows much 
the same logic suggesting that countries strongly connected 
to bordering nations through trade agreements will suffer 
more economically from conflict with those nations (Mar-
tin, Mayer, and Thoenig 2008).
Next, we add a variable for natural resource dependence 
because of recent evidence indicating a “Natural Resource 
Curse” whereby natural resources actually hurt growth and 
increase the likelihood of violence (Auty 2007). The theory 
cites a number of different possible motivations for the 
Paradox of Plenty, but ultimately concludes that extensive 
natural resources hurt long-term economic growth because 
of internal disputes over rents that create further conflict.
Lastly, we include a variable to control for education, gross 
enrollment rates in secondary education, which is absent 
from some studies but the main focus of others (Barakat 
and Urdal 2009; Marcus, Islam, and Moloney 2008). We 
use two additional measures of educational attainment, 
and these variables also cause significant changes in the size 
and sign of the coefficients of the traditional youth bulge 
variable.
2. Data Description
As reported in Table 1, the average level of the conflict, 
ConflictSum Index, is 3.16 but there is extensive variation 
around this mean indicated by the large standard deviation 
of 5.19. The average Youth Risk Factor is 0.44, which indi-
cates that the 17 to 26 age group is approximately equal to 
44 percent of the total labor force, a large percentage. The 
data sources are listed in the Annex.
There are several points to make beyond the summary stat-
istics in Table 1. First, we provide more information about 
the population data from the International Data Base 
(IDB) of the U.S. Census Bureau because of the central role 
it plays in our dataset. The IDB data is quite detailed, with 
populations broken down into narrowly defined age 
cohorts as well as gender. It is also accurate because of their 
population cohort method, which incorporates exogenous 
factors that influence demographics into their projections. 
They account for the timing and demographic impact of 
certain events like wars, famine, immigration, and natural 
disasters, which often change the demographics of a 
country but are rarely accounted for in population data. 
Furthermore, the U.S. Census Bureau updates the 
information twice each year and is often cited by policy-
makers and researchers who utilize international demo-
graphic data. They work “with a precision exceeding that of 
other online resources for international demographic data” 
(U.S. Census Bureau). 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 3. Results
Table 2 presents the regression results. Model 1 is repre-
sentative of work by Marcus, Barakat, Urdal, and Bloom, 
which utilized fewer countries and worked with data in 
five-year increments. In this model, the youth bulge, as 
traditionally defined, has a significant positive effect on 
conflict, although the standard error is relatively large. 
Additionally, the youth bust does not have a statistically 
significant effect in this model, although some research 
and a few of our subsequent models found a significantly 
negative effect. Several other variables are significant 
determinants of conflict and have the expected signs. 
Total population and number of bordering countries 
increase the intensity and likelihood of conflict. However, 
the magnitude of both variables is fairly small and sug-
gests that small-scale changes will have a relatively small 
impact on overall conflict. Rule of law, as measured by 
the World Governance Indicators, and GDP growth are 
significantly negative, as expected, and diminish a 
country’s conflict score. These signs match previous find-
ings in the literature. The only unexpected sign is the 
positive significance of telephone lines per 100 people, 
which we would expect to be negative. However, Model 1 
is the only model with this result.
In Model 2, we apply our expanded dataset to Model 1 
and the significance of the traditional youth bulge vari-
able vanishes, although the significance of the other 
main variables holds. This loss of significance shows the 
high sensitivity of the traditional youth bulge variable 
and the weakness of its prior significance. Model 3 
includes three important control variables that have typi-
cally been left out of previous literature: trade openness, 
gross secondary enrollment rate, and natural resource 
rents. All have the expected signs, but are insignificant in 
this model. Youth bulge remains insignificant, actually 
changing sign, which calls into question earlier theories 
that the mere presence of large youth cohorts incites 
conflict. Additionally, the argument supplied in earlier 
literature, that older populations help temper the strong 
emotions of youth and prevent violence from occurring, 
does not to hold for our larger sample and time period, 
suggesting the causal roots of youth violence lie else-
where.
Variable
Conflict Dummy 
 (dumSII)
ConflictSum Index
GDP Growth
GDP per Capita
ICRG Rule of Law
Inflation
Lag of Conflict Dummy 
(dumSII) 
Lag of ConflictSum
Land Area
Length of Borders
Natural Resource Rents 
as percent of GDP
Number of Bordering 
Countries
Number of Ethnic 
Groups
Number of Telephone 
Lines per 100
Total Population
Trade Openness
Traditional Youth Bulge
Youth Bust
World Bank Gross En-
rollment Rates
World Governance Indi-
cators Rule of Law
Youth Risk Factor
Mean
0.511
3.163
4.316
9.954
0.632
22.35
0.503
3.027
7.241
2.783
9.830
3.468
3.576
19.703
35.133
88.365
0.272
1.686
73.624
–0.073
0.444
Standard 
 deviation
0.499
5.194
5.915
16.800
0.221
510.328
0.500
4.983
19.130
3.433
18.537
2.625
1.818
20.101
128.629
50.589
0.081
0.407
31.356
1.001
0.143
Min.
0
0
–41.3
0.072
0.08
–16.117
0
0
0.0002
0
0
0
1
0.0057
0.0311
14.932
0.109
0.791
5.168
–2.21
0.166
Max.
1
61
106.279
138.774
1
24411.03
1
61
163.768
22.117
214.49
14
10
90.366
1330.141
445.911
0.418
2.750
162.348
2.01
0.908
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Table 2: Youth Demographics and Violent Conflict Regression Results
 
Dependent variable is:
Explanatory Variables
Traditional Youth Bulge
Youth Risk Factor
Youth Bust
Total Population
Number of Ethnic Groups
GDP per Capita
GDP Growth
Telephone Lines
Rule of Law – WGI
Rule of Law – ICRG
Total Land Area
Length of Borders
Bordering Countries
Gross Enrollment Rates
Natural Resource Rents
Trade Openness
Inflation
Lag of ConflictSum
Constant
Observations
Countries
Chi squared value
Log-likelihood
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.
Model 1  
ConflictSum
3.766*
(2.021)
–0.537
(0.300)
0.00217**
(.000849)
0.0613
(.0414)
0.00608
(.00853)
–0.0367**
(0.0171)
0.0150**
(0.00767)
–0.390***
(0.146)
(0.146)
(0.00750)
–0.00379
(.0472)
0.0882**
(0.0389)
6.69e-05
(0.00271)
0.909***
(0.0236)
–0.545
(0.588)
650
134
2570
–1281
Model 2  
ConflictSum
0.966
(1.513)
–0.186
(0.211)
0.00253***
(0.000557)
0.0687**
(0.0325)
0.00181
(0.00500)
–0.0223**
(0.0111)
0.00281
(0.00598)
–0.205**
(0.104)
0.00864*
(0.00460)
0.00815
(0.0367)
0.0152
(0.0291)
–3.08e-05
(8.95e-05)
0.937***
(0.0117)
0.106
(0.451)
1.715
166
11176
–3769
Model 3  
ConflictSum
–0.0284
(1.888)
–0.301
(0.305)
0.00309***
(0.000687)
0.0828**
(0.0391)
0.00160
(0.00591)
–0.0118
(0.0152)
0.00129
(0.00683)
–0.171
(0.136)
0.00968*
(0.00552)
–0.0209
(0.0430)
0.00974
(0.0348)
–0.00359
(0.00438)
0.00460
(0.00523)
–0.00236
(0.00154)
–0.000116
(0.00187)
0.951***
(0.0152)
1.048
(0.897)
1.270
159
7589
–2831
Model 4  
ConflictSum
1.489**
(0.652)
–0.419
(0.285)
0.00318***
(0.000690)
0.0958**
(0.0396)
0.00465
(0.00601)
–0.0123
(0.0154)
0.00336
(0.00649)
–0.129
(0.138)
0.00907*
(0.00554)
–0.0110
(0.0435)
0.00491
(0.0348)
–0.00342
(0.00432)
0.00313
(0.00529)
–0.00253*
(0.00155)
0.000145
(0.00189)
0.948***
(0.0154)
0.487
(0.810)
1.250
157
7451
–2794
Model 5  
ConflictSum
1.833**
(0.744)
–0.594*
(0.331)
0.00273***
(0.000725)
0.0836*
(0.0476)
0.00656
(0.00761)
0.00188
(0.0188)
0.00109
(0.00702)
(0.00702)
(0.492)
0.00815
(0.00591)
0.00753
(0.0468)
–0.00637
(0.0377)
–0.00575
(0.00509)
–3.41e-05
(0.00590)
–0.00234
(0.00171)
0.000451
(0.00196)
0.958***
(0.0167)
0.895
(0.982)
1.034
128
6479
–2350
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Model 4 replaces the traditional Youth Bulge measure with 
the Youth Risk Factor variable. Youth Risk Factor is positive 
and statistically significant with a p-value of 0.022. This 
strong result supports our argument that the real impetus 
for conflict in societies with large youth cohorts is the frus-
tration that results from the pressure exerted on the labor 
force by the rising generation.3 Larger youth cohorts 
relative to the labor force are associated with significantly 
higher conflict scores.4 Interestingly, education is insig-
nificant in all variants of our model, including in later 
robustness checks, supporting our hypothesis that edu-
cation does not change the plight of youth entrants to the 
labor force. An interaction effect between education and 
Youth Risk Factor was not significant in any model, indi-
cating that the effect of Youth Risk Factor does not change 
with increased enrollment rates.
To assess the magnitude of the Youth Risk Factor effect, a 
0.1 unit increase raises conflict on average by 0.15 units of 
the HIIK conflict index. There are several countries that are 
more than two standard deviations away from the mean 
Youth Risk Factor of 0.44. Thus, for these countries, demo-
graphic change of the Youth Risk Factor can lead to nearly 
a half point change in conflict on an annual basis. This 
magnitude shows the importance of demographics in the 
study of conflict.
Trade openness is significant in Model 4 and its inclusion 
lowers the point estimates for rule of law and GDP growth, 
which were significant in the prior Model 3. Finally, gross 
secondary enrollment rate and natural resource rents 
maintain the expected sign yet remain insignificant.
3.1. Robustness and Subsequent Observations
To further validate our findings, we did extensive robust-
ness testing. In Model 5 (see Table 2), we substituted the 
International Country Risk guide’s measurement of rule of 
law for the World Governance Indicator’s measurement. 
The results did not change substantially, with the sig-
nificance and size of Youth Risk Factor actually increasing. 
In addition, using primary enrollment rate or primary 
education completion rate as the measure of education did 
not alter the main results. Like gross secondary enrollment 
rate, these coefficients were insignificant, while the Youth 
Risk Factor remained significant. An interesting result of 
our robustness testing is the negative and significant effect 
of youth bust in Model 5. This indicates that more youth 
under age 14 is associated with less conflict.
Table 3 reports results for models where the dependent 
variable is a dummy indicating a conflict score above 1. We 
chose 1 as the dividing line because there are numerous 
cases in the data of a country receiving a conflict score of 1. 
In other words, such “minor” conflicts are common.5 In 
logit, probit, and generalized least squares estimations, the 
youth bust variable is strongly significant in all three.
We also investigated how the coefficients of interest 
changed as the time period changed. Marcus, Islam, and 
Moloney (2008) utilize data from 1998 to 2005. Our data-
set includes 1996 to 2010. The Youth Risk Factor remains 
significant if the years are restricted to 1997 to 2005 and 
also if they are restricted to 2006 to 2010. The traditional 
measure of youth bulge was not significant when estimated 
using data that included the years 2006 to 2010, as reported 
in Model 2 (see Table 2).
3 This result is not a function of the time period, 
as it is statistically significant when the sample is 
restricted to 1997–2005, as in prior literature, and 
also for the 2006–2010 subperiod.
4 With regard to the type of conflict, it is possible 
to identify whether a conflict is inter- or intra-state. 
The results do not differ markedly when the 
dependent variable is based solely on intra or solely 
on inter-state conflicts. Furthermore, the results are 
not driven by a series of small conflicts. In our data-
set, only five observations have more than three level 
1 conflicts in a given year.
5 The results hold if the dependent variable is 
alternatively defined as a dummy indicating conflict 
greater than 2, or greater than 3. If the dummy indi-
cates conflict greater than 4, then the magnitude of 
the coefficient is similar, but not significant at the 
0.10 level.
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Table 3: Regression Results for Binary Indicators of Conflict 4. Case Studies: Arab Spring Focus
 The significant coefficients for Youth Risk Factor support 
our theory that the causal root of youth violence arises 
from the stress placed on the labor force to absorb 
relatively large youth generations. To further illustrate this 
point, we discuss several countries that have high Youth 
Risk Factor values in 2010, the last year of our data, and 
have also experienced political unrest and violence in 2011 
and 2012, as part of the Arab Spring.
 Tunisia, the first country to experience tumult in the Arab 
world, had an average Youth Risk Factor value of 0.60 over 
the last decade, with the highest value reaching 0.63, which 
is nearly one and one-half standard deviations above the 
Youth Risk Factor mean of 0.44. These relatively high 
scores indicate the Tunisian labor force was under con-
siderable pressure to absorb young workers. And in 2011, 
considerable unrest rocked the country with the Jasmine 
Revolution. The United Nations estimates more than three 
hundred individuals died and close to seven hundred were 
injured during the month-long uprising from December 
2010 to January 2011 (Zagger 2011). In comparison, Tuni-
sia’s youth bulge score is 0.27 over the last decade, equal to 
the cross-country mean, indicating the mere presence of 
young people or the size of older populations was not a 
main reason for the unrest.
 Egypt’s figures look similar, if not more pronounced, over 
the last decade. The average Youth Risk Factor value for 
Egypt is 0.68, with several values around 0.72 in the late 
2000s that are fully two standard deviations above the 
Youth Risk Factor mean. We believe this high Youth Risk 
Factor value is consistent with recent events where approxi-
mately 850 people died in the Egyptian uprisings (El Deeb 
2012). The average traditional youth bulge value is only 
0.32, well within one standard deviation of the mean of 
0.27, once again indicating the importance of the size of 
the labor force in determining levels of youth frustration 
and subsequent violence.
 The story extends to one of the most violent conflict areas 
in the world, Syria where death estimates are as high as 
eighty thousand (Associated Press 2013). Syria posts sev-
eral of the highest Youth Risk Factor values in our sample. 
.....
Dependent variable is 1 if 
ConflictSum exceeds 1
Explanatory Variables
Youth Risk Factor
Youth Bust
Total Population
Number of Ethnic Groups
GDP per Capita
GDP Growth
Telephone Lines
Rule of Law – WGI
Total Land Area
Length of Borders
Bordering Countries
Gross Enrollment Rate
Natural Resource Rents
Trade Openness
Inflation
Lag of Conflict Dummy
Constant
Observations
Countries
Chi squared value
Log-likelihood
(1)
Logit
dumSII2
3.589**
(1.420)
–1.676***
(0.602)
0.0170***
(0.00587)
0.156*
(0.0871)
0.0142
(0.0109)
–0.00963
(0.0238)
0.0207
(0.0133)
–0.987***
(0.280)
0.0136
(0.0140)
–0.0789
(0.0904)
0.0649
(0.0755)
–0.00951
(0.00816)
0.0119
(0.00974)
–0.00471
(0.00333)
0.00130
(0.00469)
3.143***
(0.251)
–0.584
(1.549)
1.250
157
308.5
–408.4
(2)
Probit
dumSII2
1.966**
(0.782)
–0.935***
(0.331)
0.00917***
(0.00314)
0.0864*
(0.0479)
0.00836
(0.00597)
–0.00708
(0.0131)
0.0111
(0.00731)
–0.547***
(0.156)
0.00803
(0.00768)
–0.0459
(0.0496)
0.0401
(0.0413)
–0.00507
(0.00449)
0.00638
(0.00522)
–0.00261
(0.00180)
0.000870
(0.00267)
1.818***
(0.143)
–0.360
(0.858)
1.250
157
371.3
–407.9
(3)
FGLS
dumSII2
0.199**
(0.0913)
–0.0844**
(0.0400)
0.000939
(.000865)
0.00777
(0.00545)
0.000838
(0.000838)
–0.00108
(0.00215)
0.00173*
(0.000906)
–0.0767***
(0.0194)
0.000643
(0.000772)
5.89e-05
(0.00606)
0.00266
(0.00487)
–0.000556
(0.000603)
0.000119
(0.000739)
–0.000552**
(0.000216)
1.52e-06
(0.000263)
0.681***
(0.0201)
0.253**
(0.114)
1.250
157
1843
–332.2
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.
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Syria’s average Youth Risk Factor score over the last three 
years of our data is an astronomically high 0.85 with its 
highest score coming in 2010 at 0.88, more than three stan-
dard deviations above the mean. Syria averaged a Youth 
Bulge value of 0.34 over the same time period, less than a 
one standard deviation above the mean. To give a sense of 
scale, in 2010 the 17 to 26 population group was the equiv-
alent of 88 percent of the labor force. Figure 2 shows the 
absence of a traditional “youth bulge” in Syria’s population 
pyramid.
Figure 3: Youth Risk Factor and Scaled Conflict Score for Syria 1998–2010
Figure 2: Syrian Population Pyramids by Gender
Male
Population (in millions) Age Group Population (in millions)
FemaleSyria - 2012
100+
95–99
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55–59
50–54
45–49
40–44
35–39
30–34
25–29
20–24
15–19
10–14
5–9
0–4
2 1.6 1.2 0.8 0.4 0 0 0.4 0.8 1.2 1.6 2
Source: International Data Base, U.S. Census Bureau.
The demographic impact on conflict is illustrated in Figure 
3, which plots the Youth Risk Factor value against conflict. 
As the Youth Risk Factor value ascends, the conflict score 
also rises and rather radically at that. Although these values 
are not holding constant the control factors as in a regres-
sion model, they do illustrate the basic positive correlation 
between Youth Risk Factor and conflict.
1.2
1
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Youth Risk Factor
Scaled Conflict Score
In addition, the reverse relationship appears to hold. For 
example, Morocco and Qatar are two states that have 
stayed relatively calm with limited violence while having 
Youth Risk Factors comfortably within one standard devi-
ation of the mean, even though Morocco has traditional 
youth bulge values similar to the other countries experi-
encing unrest. The correlation appears not to apply only to 
the onset of violence either. Over the last decade Iraq, for 
example, has only been about one standard deviation 
above the mean for the traditional Youth Bulge but has the 
highest Youth Risk Factor score in our sample at 0.91, 
showing the possible importance of demographics on the 
conflict in Iraq.
 Numerous other factors have played important roles in 
these uprisings. Such things as police brutality, important 
historical events, new social media, and social tensions have 
all been important at times. However, the Youth Risk Fac-
tor is a potentially key determinant of subsequent violence.
5. Conclusion and Policy Implications
 Following these case studies, the logical question is where 
conflict will strike next. Several countries yet to experience 
conflict are more than two standard deviations above the 
mean Youth Risk Factor value of 0.44, which places them in 
a range of high risk. Other countries in the Middle East 
appear to be in jeopardy, most notably Jordan and Algeria. 
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Both have seen an uptick in their Youth Risk Factor score 
with values hovering above 0.8 for Jordan and above 0.7 for 
Algeria, which are more than two standard deviations above 
the mean. Two other countries that score highly are Swazi-
land in southern Africa and Iran. Both have experienced 
relatively little violence but have Youth Risk Factor scores 
above 0.7 over the last decade. Several other countries like 
Pakistan, Nigeria, and Sudan have high scores, but con-
tinued violence in those nations would not be surprising.
 For nations currently experiencing or sure to face large 
youth cohorts in the future, the Youth Risk Factor measure 
shows the importance of labor market reform and creating 
effective ways for youth to be absorbed into labor markets. 
Potential policy options for these nations would be to sub-
sidize and invest in apprenticeships, trade schools, and 
internship systems to help make the transition into the 
labor force more gradual and less frustrating for youth. 
Even if they are not highly paid, making a path to future 
work might be enough to ease frustration and build the 
labor force, while avoiding violence. Also, the significantly 
negative effect of rule of law shows the importance of pro-
tecting intellectual property rights and allowing entrepre-
neurial gains to be safe from government appropriation. 
Additionally, the insignificance of education in all of our 
models and secondary regressions shows that blanket 
increases in access to education do not consistently lead to 
reduced conflict. More emphasis can be placed on helping 
youth make a successful transition into the labor force, 
regardless of their educational backgrounds,. While the 
developed world devotes at least marginal attention to the 
transition into the labor force, much more extensive work 
is required on the transitions taking place in the developing 
world.
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Annex
Description of Variables and Data Sources
Variable Description
Conflict Dummy (dumSII) – binary dummy indicating whether a country had con-
flict (ConflistSum score>1) or no reported conflict
ConflictSum – a composite index formed as the sum of interstate and intrastate 
scores formulated from HIIK Conflict Barometers 1996–2010
GDP Growth – annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on 
constant local currency. Aggregates are based on constant 2000 U.S. dollars
GDP per Capita – gross domestic product divided by midyear population
Rule of Law (PRS)
Inflation – measured by the consumer price index reflects the annual percentage 
change in the cost to the average consumer of acquiring a basket of goods and 
services 
Land Area – land area is the aggregate of all surfaces delimited by international 
boundaries and/or coastlines, excluding inland water bodies 
Length of Borders – length of all land boundaries
Natural Resource Rents as percent of GDP – the sum of oil rents, natural gas 
rents, coal rents (hard and soft), mineral rents, and forest rents
Number of Bordering Countries
Number of Ethnic Groups – number of major ethnic groups within a country
Number of Telephone Lines per 100 people
Total Population
Trade Openness – the sum of exports and imports of goods and services 
measured as a share of gross domestic product
Traditional Youth Bulge – age group 15–24 divided by Population>15
Youth Bust – age group 0–14 divided by age group 15–24
Gross Enrollment Rates – the total enrollment in secondary education, regardless 
of age, expressed as a percentage of the population of official secondary edu-
cation age
Primary Education Completion – total enrollment in primary education, regardless 
of age, expressed as a percentage of the population of official primary education 
age
World Governance Indicators Rule of Law – captures perceptions of the extent to 
which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in par-
ticular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the 
courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence
Youth Risk Factor – age group 17–26 divided by size of total labor force
Data Source
Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict (HIIK) Research, Germany
Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict (HIIK) Research, Germany
World Development Indicators – World Bank
World Development Indicators – World Bank
International Country Risk Guide
World Development Indicators – World Bank
The World Factbook – CIA
The World Factbook – CIA
World Development Indicators – World Bank
The World Factbook – CIA
The World Factbook – CIA
World Development Indicators – World Bank
International Data Base – U.S. Census Bureau
World Development Indicators – World Bank
International Data Base – U.S. Census Bureau
International Data Base – U.S. Census Bureau
World Development Indicators – World Bank
World Development Indicators – World Bank
World Governance Indicators
International Data Base – U.S. Census Bureau
